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ISSUE CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 23(c)(4):
A REAPPRAISAL
Mark A. Perry*
INTRODUCTION
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,1 the Supreme Court reiterated
that "[t]he class action is 'an exception to the usual rule that litigation
is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.'- 2
As the Dukes Court stressed, departure from that rule must be justi-
fied.3 Such a justification may be found in a properly conducted class
action, but only if the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 are carefully adhered to.4
As exemplified by the title of this Symposium, Class Action
Rollback?, many observers expect that Dukes will reduce the number
of class actions certified. This has led some practitioners and academ-
ics to propose various strategies for increasing the number of classes
certified in the wake of Dukes. Professor John C. Coffee, in particu-
lar, has offered what he calls a "trail map" for expanding future class
actions.5
According to Professor Coffee, "[a]s of this juncture, the long-term
future of the class action is in doubt, and only some basic com-
promises (such as the acceptance of partial certification) seem capable
of preserving it as a broad form of litigation practice."' 6 Unlike some
of the other post-Dukes proposals, the practice of "partial" or "issue"
certification has a textual basis: Rule 23(c)(4) provides that "[w]hen
* Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law
Center. I have represented parties or amici in several of the cases discussed in this Article, but
the views expressed herein are entirely my own. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of
Lochlan Shelfer, a student at Yale Law School, in preparing this Article for publication.
1. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. Id. at 2550 (emphasis added) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)).
3. See id.
4. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008).
5. John C. Coffee, Jr., The New Class Action Landscape: A Trail Map to Class Certification
and Practice in the Era After Wal-Mart and Concepcion, THE 15TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS (Oct. 14, 2011).
6. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUREAU NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE NEW CLASS ACTION LANDSCAPE:
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CLASS CERTIFICATION AND RELATED TOPICS 2005-2011, at S-
51 (2011) (emphasis added).
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appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues."'7
The proper scope of issue certification under Rule 23(c)(4) has di-
vided the appellate courts, and has not yet been addressed directly by
the Supreme Court. The Court has, however, adopted an interpretive
methodology for construing Rule 23, which requires examining the
text and structure of the Rule itself in light of the Rules Enabling Act,
the Constitution, and historical practice. 8 The part of the Dukes opin-
ion construing Rule 23(b)(2) was a straightforward, and unanimous,
application of this methodology.
This Article uses the Supreme Court's interpretive methodology to
reappraise the extant judicial approaches to Rule 23(c)(4), as well as
Professor Coffee's proposal for a more expansive use of issue certifi-
cation. It concludes that issue certification is properly limited to bifur-
cating liability from remedies, and does not allow the certification (or
exclusion) of discrete claim elements and defenses as advocated by
Professor Coffee and permitted by some courts.
II. DISCUSSION
The class action is an exceptional form of litigation because, among
other things, the final judgment in such an action implicates the rights
of absent persons. Overly capacious standards for class action certifi-
cations endanger absent parties' procedural and substantive rights.
In Taylor v. Sturgell, a unanimous Court reiterated the foundational
judicial principle that absent persons may not be bound by judgments
unless one of a limited number of historically recognized exceptions is
satisfied. 9 One such exception is for a "properly conducted" class ac-
tion, which requires the following: (1) "the interests of the nonparty
and her representative are aligned"; (2) "either the party understood
herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court
took care' to protect the interests of the nonparty"; and (3) there was
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
8. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 817-18 (1999).
9. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008). This opinion enumerated six circumstances
in which nonparties may be bound by judgments: (1) they "agree[ ] to be bound," id. at 893
(quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 40 (1980)); (2) they have "substantive
legal relationship[s]" to a party, id. at 894 (quoting DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRE-
CLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 78 (2001)); (3) they are "adequately represented" in "properly con-
ducted class actions," id. (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)); (4) they
"'assume[ ] control' over the litigation," id. at 895 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 154 (1979)); (5) they litigate through a "proxy," id.; or (6) they are precluded by "a special
statutory scheme" (e.g. bankruptcy), id. The Taylor Court declined to add a seventh category
for so-called "virtual representation," suggesting that this enumeration is now exclusive.
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"notice of the original suit to the persons alleged to have been repre-
sented." 10 In the class action context, the Taylor Court continued,
"these limitations are implemented by the procedural safeguards in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23."11 These protections are constitu-
tionally mandated and "grounded in due process.' 2
Rule 23 thus provides a constitutional safe harbor for litigants pur-
suing a class action. Litigants must, however, comply precisely with
the strictures of Rules 23(a) and (b) to remain in that safe harbor.
Consistent with the text of the Rule, the Court has repeatedly held
that "the party seeking certification must demonstrate, first, that
[Rule 23(a)'s requirements are met]," and "[s]econd, the proposed
class must satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule
23(b).' 3 As the advisory committee's note to Rule 23(c)(1), which
pertains to certification orders, confirms, "[t]he [certification] deter-
mination depends in each case on satisfaction of the terms of subdivi-
sion (a) and the relevant provisions of subdivision (b).' 14
Rule 23 is, after all, a rule. The Supreme Court can amend Rule 23
prospectively, but the federal courts otherwise have no license to de-
part from its requirements. Some parts of Rule 23 are discretionary
and some are mandatory-but it is not a mere suggestion or guideline.
As the Taylor Court emphasized, there are no "common-law" class
actions.' 5 Instead, nonparty preclusion requires "crisp rules with
sharp corners. ' ' t6
In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Supreme Court articulated an ana-
lytical methodology for resolving questions concerning the application
of Rule 23.17 The Court in Ortiz held that courts must be careful to
10. Id. at 894, 900.
11. Id. at 900-01.
12. Id. at 901.
13. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011); see also Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) ("In addition to satisfying Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites, parties
seeking class certification must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or
(3)." (emphasis added)).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee's note (1966) (emphasis added); see also
Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179 186 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting
the "overlap between compliance with Rule 23(c)(1)(B) and compliance with Rule 23(c)(4)(A),"
which "shed[s] light on a district court's numerosity, commonality, typicality, and predominance
analysis under Rule 23(a) and (b)").
15. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 901.
16. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). Ortiz was one of two cases involving
asbestos settlement classes, the other being Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1999). Both cases concerned mandatory class action settlements designed to limit liability, and
in both cases the Court rejected the proposed classes because a judgment would limit the claims
of future and absent plaintiffs. The Court in both cases emphasized the limits Rule 23 places on
what types of class actions may be certified. As Justice Ginsburg wrote in Amchem, "of overrid-
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avoid certifying classes that would violate the rights of litigants, in-
cluding the representative plaintiffs, absent class members, and de-
fendants. The Court ruled that these rights could best be protected by
applying Rule 23 in accordance with the foundational principles of the
Constitution, the Rules Enabling Act, and historical practice.
First, the Court held that the Constitution limits certain classes from
being certified. For example, class actions are subject to the Seventh
Amendment's jury-trial guarantees,' 8 and thus any class that would
deny the jury rights of a party cannot be certified. Moreover, the
Court held that Rule 23 operates against the backdrop of the Due
Process Clause rule that all litigants must have their "day in court." 19
Second, the Rules Enabling Act simultaneously authorizes the Su-
preme Court to adopt rules of procedure, and mandates that those
rules may not "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." 20
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "Rule 23's requirements
must be interpreted in keeping with" and "with fidelity to" the Rules
Enabling Act.21 This has two consequences for all federal courts.
First, the Rules Enabling Act precludes judicial tinkering with Rule 23
outside the special process for adopting and amending all procedural
rules.22 Second, the Rules Enabling Act prevents certification of clas-
ses that would deny any particular individual's substantive right.23 In
the class action context, a common dispositive question is whether the
litigants are accorded the same procedural rights that they would pos-
sess in an individual suit.
ing importance, courts must be mindful that the Rule as now composed sets requirements they
are bound to enforce." Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620. Similarly, Justice Souter stated in Ortiz that
any tension between class certification and other substantive rights "is best kept within tolerable
limits" by keeping interpretations of Rule 23 "close to the practice preceding its adoption." Or-
tiz, 527 U.S. at 845.
18. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 845-46 ("[T]he certification of a mandatory class followed by settlement
of its action for money damages obviously implicates the Seventh Amendment jury trial rights of
absent class members.").
19. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (referencing the "deep-rooted historic tra-
dition that everyone should have his own day in court" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846 ("[M]andatory class actions aggregating damages claims implicate the
due process 'principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to
which he has not been made a party by service of process."' (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 40 (1940))).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
21. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613, 629.
22. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 845; see id. at 861 ("[W]e are bound to follow Rule 23 as we under-
stood it upon its adoption, and ... we are not free to alter it except through the process pre-
scribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.").
23. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
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Third, the Court has found that historical practice imposes substan-
tive constraints on what sort of classes may be certified. This has in-
cluded examining the advisory committee's notes for the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and looking to equitable and legal practices
from before the fusion of law and equity. For instance, the Court in
Ortiz held that the advisory committee's notes counseled against ex-
panding "limited funds" beyond their historical basis in equitable
trusts. As the Court stated, "[t]he prudent course ... is to presume"
that Rule 23's limited fund classes were designed to "stay close to the
historical model." 24
Although Ortiz has been on the books for more than a decade, few
lower courts have applied its interpretative methodology to disputes
over the applicability of Rule 23. That should change.
In the unanimous part of Dukes, the Court held that individualized
claims for monetary relief could not be certified under Rule
23(b)(2). 25 In so doing, the Dukes Court applied the methodology
from Ortiz, reasoning that allowing such claims to proceed collectively
would be inconsistent with the Constitution, the Rules Enabling Act,
and historical practice.
First, according to the Dukes Court, the Due Process Clause is vio-
lated when class actions predominantly for money damages lack no-
tice and opt-out procedures.2 6 Even when the monetary claims do not
predominate, there is still a "serious possibility" that lack of notice
and opt-out violates due process, and thus "provides an additional
reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include monetary claims here. '2 7
Second, the Court held that the Rules Enabling Act mandated al-
lowing defendants to raise their affirmative defenses. The plaintiffs
suggested the use of statistical sampling to determine what percentage
of the class's claims was valid. The Court rejected this approach,
which it labeled "Trial by Formula." In an ordinary proceeding, in-
cluding one involving "pattern or practice" allegations, a plaintiff
would first establish a pattern or practice of discrimination and the
defendant could then prove affirmative defenses. 28 As the Court ex-
24. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842; see also id. at 843-44 (finding that the advisory committee's notes
"did not contemplate" limited fund classes for tort cases).
25. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) ("A class action may be
maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if... the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole .... " (emphasis added)).
26. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2561.
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plained, "[b]ecause the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule
23 to 'abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,' a class cannot
be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to liti-
gate its statutory defenses to individual claims."'29
Third, the Dukes Court noted that historical practice prior to the
adoption of the Rule, as explicated in the advisory committee's notes,
did not accord with allowing monetary claims in a Rule 23(b)(2) ac-
tion. According to the Court, the committee adopted the Rule to
remedy racial desegregation claims, which (if liability were estab-
lished) could be enforced by a single classwide order. However, as the
Court stated, "[i]n none of the cases cited by the Advisory Committee
as examples of (b)(2)'s antecedents did the plaintiffs combine any
claim for individualized relief with their classwide injunction. 30
The Rule 23(b)(2) holding of Dukes was thus an example of the
Court's application of the established Ortiz methodology to ascertain
the boundaries of Rule 23. The Court adhered to its consistent ap-
proach of conforming to the Constitution, the Rules Enabling Act,
and historical practice when interpreting procedural rules. Some crit-
ics of Dukes do not like the constraints that this interpretation places
on class certification. But this is a necessary consequence of Rule 23,
which imposes constitutionally based limitations on the ability of fed-
eral courts to adjudicate collective claims.
As the thought leader of the Dukes critics, Professor Coffee has
proposed "partial certification" as one "path out of the wilderness"
that avoids the "roadblock" of Dukes.31 Indeed, according to Profes-
sor Coffee, "the best hope for survival of the class action in money
damages cases may lie in the expansion of issue certification under
Rule 23(c)(4). ' 32 Coffee further posits that "one way courts could
protect the viability of the class action [is] by . . . employing partial
certification." 33
Partial certification, in Professor Coffee's view, is a process whereby
"the defendant's liability could be established at the class trial." 34
Then, "individual issues, such as reliance, proximate causation, or
damages could be established in separate proceedings. '35 Courts
29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 255.
31. Coffee, Jr., supra note 5, at 158, 160.
32. Id. at 159.
33. Id. at 160-61.
34. Id. at 159.
35. Id.
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could also "relegate the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant
to individual actions." 36
The sole virtue of Professor Coffee's proposal is that, unlike some
of the other proposals put forward by critics of Dukes, it is grounded
in the language of Rule 23: "When appropriate, an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues." 37
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed issue certification
under Rule 23(c)(4), and the appellate courts have taken three princi-
pal approaches to issue certification-although none has gone so far
as Professor Coffee suggests.
The Fifth Circuit has characterized Rule 23(c)(4) as a "housekeep-
ing rule that allows courts to sever . . . common issues for a class
trial."'38 It is not an independent basis for class certification, and "a
cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance require-
ment of (b)(3)," because a "district court cannot manufacture pre-
dominance through the nimble use of subdivision (c)(4). ' '39 Thus,
only in a properly certified class that first meets the requirements of
subdivisions (a) and (b) may (c)(4) be used to manage the action. 40
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, interprets Rule 23(c)(4) to
permit "divided certification," which allows courts to separately "cer-
tify the injunctive aspects of the suit under Rule 23(b)(2) and the
damages aspects under Rule 23(b)(3). ' 41 This permits certification of
less than an entire action, provided that such certification concerns a
question central to the litigation (such as liability) and otherwise does
not compromise a defendant's rights.42
The Second Circuit follows a middle ground, allowing issue certifi-
cation when a number of questions would remain for individual adju-
dication unless the court finds that "issue certification would not
reduce the range of issues in dispute and promote judicial econ-
omy."' 43 This approach has led to inconsistent results within the Sec-
ond Circuit. In one leading case, for example, the court refused to
36. Id.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
38. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745-46 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Corley v. Orangefield Indep. Sch. Dist., 152 F. App'x 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2005).
41. Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999).
42. See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 2005); Carnegie v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004); Merjdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910,
911-12 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995).
43. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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allow issue certification because "the issue of defendants' scheme to
defraud[] would not materially advance the litigation because it
would not dispose of larger issues, such as reliance, injury, and dam-
ages. '144 On the other hand, in another leading case, the court ruled
that an issue may be certified regardless of whether the claim as a
whole satisfies the predominance test.45
However, none of these approaches is wholly satisfactory. No court
of appeals has performed the Ortiz analysis, which requires interpret-
ing the text of the Rule, and then checking that construction against
the Constitution, the Rules Enabling Act, and historical practice.
Conducting that inquiry-to which the Supreme Court unanimously
subscribed in Dukes-points up the shortcomings in the extant cases
as well as the fatal flaws in Professor Coffee's proposal that courts
apply Rule 23(c)(4) expansively.
The text of Rule 23(c)(4), to reiterate, provides: "When appropri-
ate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues."' 46 Several terms within the text of this
provision require construction. The Rule states that its provisions ap-
ply "[w]hen appropriate." This language refers to judicial discretion.
The Rule further provides that "an action may be brought or main-
tained," which refers to a civil action in federal court.47 The Rule goes
on, "as a class action." Rule 23 has already defined class actions; they
are those actions that meet the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), and
also fall into one of the three categories of Rule 23(b).48 Finally, the
Rule concludes, "with respect to particular issues." The term "issues"
has been the focal point of the divergent approaches in interpreting
Rule 23(c)(4).
The key question is therefore presented: Does the term "issues" in
Rule 23(c)(4) encompass claim elements (such as causation or reli-
ance) and defenses (such as knowledge or consent)? If it does not,
then Professor Coffee's proposal fails.
The advisory committee's notes elaborate somewhat on the concept
of issue certification: "For example, in a fraud or similar case the ac-
tion may retain its 'class' character only through the adjudication of
liability to the class; the members of the class may thereafter be re-
44. Id.
45. In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Searches, 461 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 2006).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. I ("These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceed-
ings in the United States district courts." (emphasis added)).
48. Cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1999) ("[T]he 'class action' to
which Rule 23(e) refers is one qualified for certification under Rule 23(a) and (b).").
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quired to come in individually and prove the amounts of their respec-
tive claims."' 49 Thus, we know that "liability" and "remedies" may be
"issues," but what about claim elements or defenses? In 1996, the ad-
visory committee considered-and rejected-an amendment to Rule
23(c)(4) that would have referenced "claims" and "defenses" in addi-
tion to "issues."'50 Professor Coffee's proposal would have courts read
the rule as if it had been amended; but it was not.
The language and structure of Rule 23 confirm that claims and de-
fenses are not "issues." Several times the Rule distinguishes between
various concepts, referring to "claims, issues, or defenses."' 51 This
means that these terms may not be used interchangeably, and that it is
significant because Rule 23(c)(a) only employs one of them. 52 That
provision's reference only to "issues"-and not "claims" or "de-
fenses"-should therefore be given effect.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that sections (a) and (b) of
Rule 23 are mandatory, while the rest of the Rule contains details for
resolving cases that involve compliant classes. Dukes explained that
"the party seeking certification must demonstrate, first, that [Rule
23(a)'s requirements are met]," and "[s]econd, the proposed class
must satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule
23(b). '' 53 Amchem, which dealt with a question similar to certification
under (c)(4)-namely, whether Rule 23(e) (dealing with class settle-
ment) allows certification of a class that does not comport with one of
the 23(b) subdivisions-observed that settlement under Rule 23(e)
"was designed to function as an additional requirement, not a super-
seding direction, for the 'class action' to which Rule 23(e) refers is one
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) advisory committee's note (emphasis added); see Minutes of the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting, Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 1963, Congressional Information Ser-
vice Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
1935-1988, No. C1-7104-53 ("[I]n fund cases, for example, the action is a class action only in
part, for after the general determination of liability the claimants must come forward individually
and prove their respective claims." (emphasis added)).
50. See Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 761
(2003).
51. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B) ("An order that certifies a class action must define
the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses .... " (emphasis added)); FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B) ("For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3) ... [t]he notice must [state] ... the
class claims, issues, or defenses .... (emphasis added)); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("The claims,
issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only
with the court's approval." (emphasis added)).
52. Cf. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) ("It is well settled that [w]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
53. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2549 (2011); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832-33 (1999).
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qualified for certification under Rule 23(a) and (b)."' 5 4 But if a class
could be certified based only on commonality, then the "vital prescrip-
tion" of predominance-which "assure[s] the class cohesion that legit-
imizes representative action in the first place"-"would be stripped of
any meaning. '55
Moreover, the headings of the sections within Rule 23 suggest that
(a) and (b) are always mandatory, while the rest of the Rule is supple-
mentary. Subdivision (a) is titled "Prerequisites to a Class Action"
and (b) is titled "Class Actions Maintainable." Subdivision (c), on the
other hand, goes by a catchall title: "Certification Order; Notice to
Class Members; Judgment; Issues Classes; Subclasses," suggesting a
wealth of comparably less important management devices to be
used-but only after Rule 23(a) and (b) are satisfied.56
The principles outlined in Ortiz reveal more fundamental problems
with issue certification as envisioned by Professor Coffee. These diffi-
culties are crystallized by examining the Constitution, the Rules Ena-
bling Act, and historical practice.
First, the Reexamination Clause 57 forbids two separate jury trials
for the same claims and facts. As the Court has stated in interpreting
this Clause, two jury trials may not be used for the same case "unless
it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separa-
ble from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injus-
tice. '58 Claim elements and defenses, however, are not "distinct and
separable" from liability. Accordingly, Professor Coffee himself has
admitted that the Seventh Amendment may prevent partial certifica-
tion.59 Therefore, "partial certification" raises significant constitu-
54. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997).
55. Id. at 623; see also Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 448 (4th Cir. 2003)
(Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The majority, adopting an expansive
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4), has enlarged the reach of Rule 23 in a manner not contemplated
by the Rule's drafters and not consistent with the Supreme Court's approach calling for an 'undi-
luted' application of Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements in every case." (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at
620)).
56. See Hines, supra note 50, at 718-19 ("Its placement in subdivision (c) ... reflects a mana-
gerial rather than a primary role for (c)(4)(A). While subdivision (b) defines types of 'Class
Actions Maintainable,' the provisions in subdivision (c) reflect the laundry list of steps a court
may take after properly certifying a subdivision (b) class action." (citation omitted)).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
58. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931).
59. Coffee, Jr., supra note 5, at 161 (noting that "[p]artial certification (which could some-
times result in two separate jury trials on legally distinct issues)" may only be legally permissible
if a plaintiff seeks equitable relief, which would allow "the plaintiff [to] escape the shadow of the
Seventh Amendment").
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tional concerns, and the rule of constitutional avoidance counsels
against an expansive use of Rule 23(c)(4). 60
Second, as noted above, the Rules Enabling Act forbids the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure from abridging or modifying any substantive
right.61 In standard (nonclass) litigation, courts frequently bifurcate
liability from damages. But claim elements or defenses are not
stripped from a trial between two adversaries. It is hard to imagine,
for example, a nonclass fraud case in which the plaintiff could estab-
lish "liability" without proving either causation' or reliance, and with-
out the defendant being permitted to present any affirmative
defenses. Yet that is Professor Coffee's proposal in a nutshell. In the
class context, litigants retain their rights and obligations to prove up
and defend against the charges. As the Court in Dukes stated, a class
cannot "be certified on the premise that [a defendant] will not be enti-
tled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims."'62 Lower
courts, too, have emphasized that a class action cannot be certified if
doing so requires relieving the plaintiffs of their burden of proving a
claim element. 63 The sort of issue certification proposed by Professor
Coffee, in short, is forbidden by the Rules Enabling Act.
Third, historical practice counsels against innovative certification
models. Professor Coffee's suggestion of partially certifying certain
claim elements in one trial and allowing the other elements and de-
fenses to proceed in separate trials expands beyond the class actions
recognized by the framers of the Rules of Civil Procedure. As the
Dukes Court confirmed when it "disapprove[d] th[e] novel project" of
using statistical sampling to determine the validity of classwide
claims,64 class actions are a particularly inappropriate forum for judi-
cial innovation because the rights of absent persons are at stake. Liti-
gating to a final and preclusive judgment pieces of a case that are
more discrete than "liability" (including all claim elements and de-
fenses) is a practice unknown to the Anglo-American legal tradition,
and thus ought to be avoided in the context of class actions.
60. Cf. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832-33 (1999).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
62. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011); cf Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (holding that the Due Process Clause must accommodate
defendants' constitutional right "to present every available defense").
63. Hohider v. UPS, Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 196 (3d Cir. 2009) ("Because the statutorily required
inquiry into qualification is incompatible with the requirements of Rule 23 in this case, and
because plaintiffs cannot adjudicate their claims and requested relief without it, the class cannot
be certified."); see also McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 232 (2d Cir. 2008)
("When fluid recovery is used to permit the mass aggregation of claims, the right of defendants
to challenge the allegations of individual plaintiffs is lost .....
64. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
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All three aspects of the Ortiz methodology thus counsel against the
use of partial certification as envisioned by Professor Coffee. And
that should not be a surprise considering that Professor Coffee's pro-
posal is highly implausible, if not impossible, on its face. How can
"liability" be established without requiring plaintiffs to prove reliance,
causation, or other elements of their claim? How can "liability" be
established without allowing defendants to prove their affirmative de-
fenses? Our system of civil justice knows of no such proceedings. To
allow such novel and unprecedented litigation strategies solely to per-
mit cases to go forward as class actions would be to sanction precisely
the kind of innovation that the Supreme Court disapproved in Dukes
and its other precedents interpreting Rule 23.
III. CONCLUSION
The path out of the wilderness lies not in ignoring Rule 23, but in
applying it as written. With respect to Rule 23(c)(4), that means that
only the "particular issues" indicated by the text and structure-that
is, "liability" and "remedies"-may be certified separately, and then
only in a case that otherwise meets the requirements of Rule 23(a)
and (b). Rule 23(c)(4) does not authorize certification or exclusion of
more discrete claim elements or defenses.
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